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1 Introduction 
In this article we consider uniform, recursive procedures for amplifying scientific competence. 
Such a procedure is called an "improvement operator" and may be conceived as a device 
that is coupled to scientists and behaves as follows. Data are presented to the improvement 
operator which delivers a possibly transformed version to its attached scientist. The scien- 
tist's responses to the data are examined and possibly modified before announced by the 
improvement operator. Thus, the improvement operator with its attached scientist amount 
to another scientist, whose competence may be compared to that of the original one. Such a 
device would be useful if it genuinely improved the competence of a wide class of scientists. 
Among other uses, improvement operators of this nature would facilitate division of labor in 
designing automated systems of scientific discovery, allowing the perfection of an approxi- 
mate system at a later stage of design by application of a uniform algorithm. (Other schemes 
for the division of labor in designing automated scientists are considered in Pitt & Smith 
(1988) and Osherson, Stob & Weinstein (1989).) The present work offers some initial steps 
toward a theory of uniform improvement of scientific competence. Two senses of "improved 
competence" are investigated. The first sense concerns the range of problems that a scientist 
solves; the second bears on the probability of solving any given problem. 
Our discussion is carried out in the context of the model of inductive inference initiated by 
Putnam (1975), Solomonoff (1964), Gold (1967), and Blum & Blum (1975). (For literature 
reviews, see Angluin & Smith (1983) and Osherson, Stob & Weinstein (1986).) In particular, 
we focus on the inference of total recursive functions. A wide variety of criteria of inductive 
success have been defined and investigated in this context (see Case & Smith (1983), Royer 
(1986)). We shall here rely on a success criterion that is more liberal than usual. However, 
the bulk of our results carry over to the standard, stricter criterion. 
Formal scientists in the paradigm at issue are called "inductive inference machines." 
It will be seen that not every class of inductive inference machines lends itself to uniform 
improvement. There is a particularly improvable class, however, that will be of central con- 
cern in the sequel. These machines are called "rigorous" inasmuch as they always announce 
testable theories of the function they are investigating. The concept of rigor is a generaliza- 
tion of the concept of "popperian" introduced and investigated by Case & Ngo-Manguelle 
(1979). (Inductive inference machines conforming to other kinds of scientific strictures have 
been studied by Fulk (1988) and Weihagen (1976), among others.) Our discussion proceeds 
as follows. Section 2 introduces the paradigm of scientific inquiry within which our results 
are stated and proved. Section 3 is devoted to comparing the problem-solving abilities of 
rigorous and nonrigorous scientists. The class of algorithms for improving scientific com- 
petence is introduced in Section 4. Improving the competence of rigorous and nonrigorous 
scientists in the two senses indicated above is the subject of Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 
presents additional results about uniform improvement. 
2 A paradigm of scientific inquiry 
2.1 Preliminaries 
Functions are interpreted extensionally, as sets of ordered pairs. The set of natural numbers 
is denoted: N. We fix an acceptable ordering of some canonical means of computation over 
N (e.g., via Turing Machines), and we index the corresponding partial recursive functions yo, 
cpl,... accordingly (for discussion of these concepts, see Machtey & Young, 1978). The index i 
may be conceived as a program for the function cp;. The class of total functions in cpo, cpl ,  ... is 
denoted: I. I represents the universe of objects to be investigated by scientists. Let n E N 
and f E I be given. We denote by " f [n]" the sequence: (0, f (0)), (1, f (1)), . . . , (n, f (n)). 
The class { f [n] ( n E N and f E I) is denoted: Seq. Seq represents the data to which 
functions in I give rise. 
Let a = (0, yo), ..., (i, y;), ..., (i + n, yi+,) be given. We denote by "mg(a)" the set 
((0, yo), ..., (i, y;), ..., (i + n, Y;+,)). The subsequence (0, yo), ..., (i, y;) is denoted: a[i]. For 
T E Seq, "lh(~)" denotes the number of pairs in T .  Thus, lh(a) = i + n + 1 (the length of a 
sequence always being 1 greater than its largest argument). We use "#(A)" to denote the 
cardinality of the set A. 
Let a recursive isomorphism between Seq and N be fixed. Implicit use of this isomor- 
phism allows cpo, cpl,  ... to be construed as functions from Seq to N. In this guise, such 
functions represent the class of possible scientists. Scientists whose input-output behavior is 
not computer-simulable are thus excluded from the present model. (They are reconsidered 
in Section 7.2.) When construed as functions from Seq to N - i.e., as (formal) scientists - 
the class {p; I i E N) is denoted: SCZ. 
2.2 Criterion of success 
We now define one sense in which a scientist solves the induction problem represented by a 
total recursive function. 
(1) DEFINITION: Let f E 7, 8 E SCZ and j E N be given. 
(a) 8 converges on f to j just in case: 
i. for all n E N, 8(f [n]) is defined; and 
ii. for all but finitely many m E N,  8(f [m]) = j. 
(b) 8 is said to weakly identify f just in case there is i E N such that: 
i. 8 converges on f to i; and 
ii. cp; is an infinite subset of f .  
Thus, to weakly identify f ,  8's conjectures on successive, finite initial segments of f must 
eventually stabilize to some one index for an infinite subset of f .  As noted above, weak 
identification is a less stringent concept than generally found in the inductive inference 
literature. Usually, clause (bii) above is replaced by: cp; = f.  Our weaker concept represents 
nontrivial scientific success without insisting that scientific knowledge be complete. For 
expositional ease, we henceforth abbreviate "weakly identify" to "identify." 
(2) DEFINITION: 8 E SCZ is said to identi& G 7 just in case 0 identifies every f E G. 
In this case, G is said to be identifiable. 
Examples of identifiable and unidentifiable subsets of 7 are given in Section 2.4. We record 
the following proposition. Its proof is left for the reader. 
(3) PROPOSITION: Let G 5 7 be identifiable, and let F 5 7 be finite. Then GU F is 
identifiable. 
2.3 Totality 
8 E SCZ need not be total to identify f E 7. (8 may be undefined on some a E Seq 
not drawn from f .) On the other hand, the following proposition shows that we may pass 
effectively from the index of a scientist to the index of a total scientist that identifies at least 
as much. Proof of the proposition is straightforward. 
(4) PROPOSITION: There is a total recursive function g such that for all i E N :  
(a) cp,(;) is total; and 
(b) for a l l  f E 7, if pi identifies f then cp,(;) identifies f .  
2.4 Two subsets of 7 
The following subsets of 7 figure prominently in the sequel. 
(5) DEFINITION: (based on Blum & Blum, 1975) Let f E 7 be given. 
(a) f is zero-one stabilized just in case for all x E N, f (x) E {O,1)  and either for all 
but finitely many n E N, f (n) = 0 or for all but finitely many n E N, f (n) = 1. 
ZOS = {g E 7 I g is zero-one stabilized). 
(b) f is self-indezing just in case for all x E N, f (x) E (0, 1) and f = cp, where y is 
the least x such that f (x) = 1. SI = ( g  E 7 ( g is self-indexing). 
It is trivial to show that both ZOS and SIare identifiable. In particular, we now fbc I' E SCZ 
that identifies ZOS. I' will figure in several proofs in later sections, as will the following lemma 
and proposition. 
(6) LEMMA: (Kleene's Recursion Theorem) Let total recursive function h be given. Then 
there is n E N such that cp, = pqn). 
PROOF: See Rogers (1967, Theorem 11-1).  
(7) PROPOSITION: (based on Blum & Blum, 1975) ZOSU SI is not identifiable. 
PROOF: We adapt a proof given by Blum & Blum (1975), relying as well as on a technique 
introduced by Barzdins (1974). Suppose that 8 E SCZ identifies ZOS. We define a total 
recursive function h such that for all y E N: 
(10) ( P ~ ( ~ ) ( z )  E {O,1} for all z E N; and 
(11) 8 does not identify cph(,). 
Application of Lemma (6) then yields n E N such that (~h(,) = (P, E SI, and 8 does not 
identify 9,. Hence 8 does not identify SI. Consequently, no 9 E SCZ identifies ZOSU SI. 
It remains to specify the function h. Let y E N be given. Then h(y) is a uniformly 
constructed index for the function cph(,) defined in stages as follows. 
Stage 0:  Let cph(,)(x) = 0 for all 2 < y. Let cph(,)(y) = 1. 
Stage n+1: Suppose that cph(,)[m] is defined. Let s, sf E ZOS be such that: 
s[ml = sf[m1 = cph(y) [ml; 
s(m + k) = 0 for all k > 0; and 
s f (m+ k) = 1 for all k > 0. 
Then, since 9 identifies ZOS, there is a least j E N such that 8(s[m + j]) # 9(s1[m + j]), 
because no index is for a function that is an infinite subset of both s and sf. Consequently, 
one of B(s[m + j]), 9(sf[m + j]) is distinct from 9(ph(,)[m]), suppose B(s[m + j]). For all k 
with m < k 5 m + j, let ph(,)(k) = ~ ( k ) .  
It is evident that oh(,) satisfies conditions (8) - (10). Regarding ( l l ) ,  the construction 
guarantees that 8 changes its conjecture infinitely often on ( ~ h ( ~ ) .   
3 Rigorous Scientists 
This section introduces the class of 'brigorous" scientists, which will be shown to be uniformly 
improvable in a strong sense. The concept of rigor was suggested to us by the analogous 
concept of "popperian" due to Case, J. & Ngo-MangueUe, S. (1979) (see also the concept of 
"accountability" in Osherson, Stob & Weinstein, 1986). 
3.1 Characterization 
(12) DEFINITION: Let 8 E SCZ be given. 
(a) 8 is rigorous just in case for all a E Seq there is a pair (x, y) such that (x, y) E 
cpe(,) - mng(a). Otherwise, 8 is nonrigorous. 
(b) The class {8 E SCZ 1 9 is rigorous} is denoted: 7tZG. 
(c) G C 7 is rigorously identifiable just in case some 8 E RZG identifies G. 
Observe that 0 E RIG implies 9 total. 
3.2 Comparison of 'RZG and SCZ 
A simple construction suffices to verify that every identifiable G 5 7 is identified by some 
nonrigorous 8 E SCZ. On the other hand, since SI is identifiable, the following proposition 
shows that rigor can interfere with identification. 
(13) PROPOSITION: SI is not rigorously identifiable. 
PROOF: Let 8 E RIG be given. Using 8 we specify a total recursive function h such that 
for ally E N: 
(14) ph(,)(x) = 0 for d 2 < y; 
(16) cph(,)(~) E { O , 1 )  for d z E N; and 
(17) 8 does not identify ph(,). 
Application of Lemma (6) then yields n E N such that 
(18) cp, E SI; and 
(19) 8 does not identify cp,. 
To specify h, let y f N be given. Then h(y) is an effectively constructed index for the 
function cph(,) that we now define in stages. 
Stage 0: Let ph(,)(x) = 0 for all x < y. Let cph(,)(y) = 1. 
Stage n f l :  Suppose that cph(,)[m] = T is defined. By choice of 8, let (a, b) be the first 
pair to emerge in some standard enumeration of cp(e(,)) - m g ( ~ ) .  
case 1: a 5 m. (Then 8(r) is not an index for a subset of the function yh(,) being defined.) 
Let cph(,) (m + 1) = 0. 
case 2: a > m. (Then B(T) is a potential index for an infinite subset of yh(,), so must be 
cancelled.) Let cph(,)(r) = 0 for all m < r < a. Let cph(,)(a) = 1 - b. 
It may be seen that for infinitely many m E N, 8(cph(,)[m]) is not an index for a subset 
of cph(,). Consequently, (17) is satisfied. It is evident that (14)-(16) are satisfied. 
4 Improvement operators 
Let P be the class of all functions from N to N. Members of P may be partial or total, recur- 
sive or nonrecursive. Officially, an improvement operator is any "recursive operator" in the 
sense of Rogers (1967, Section 9.8)) that is, any effective, total mapping of P into P. Rather 
than review the definition of recursive operator, we state the properties of improvement 
operators to be used in what follows. 
(20) PROPERTY: Let J be an improvement operator. Then there is a total recursive 
function f such that for all i E N, J(cp;) = yf(;). 
(21) PROPERTY: Let M be a "Turing machine with oracle," or "oracle machine" in the 
sense of Rogers (1967, Section 9.2). Then there is an improvement operator J such 
that for all total 9 E SCZ, J(9) is the function computed by M e .  
(22) PROPERTY: The class of improvement operators is closed under composition. 
(23) PROPERTY: Let improvement operator J be given, and let 9, fl E SCZ be such that 
8 $2. Then J(9) J(Q). 
(24) PROPERTY: The class of improvement operators is countably infinite. 
Properties (22) and (23) are taken directly from Rogers (1967). Property (24) follows im- 
mediately from the countability of the partial recursive functions. Properties (20) and (21) 
are easily deduced from the relevant definitions. 
Note that improvement operators map functions into functions. They do not map pro- 
grams into programs. Algorithms of this latter sort are of limited use since they can be 
applied only to scientists with known internal program. We return to this topic in Section 
7.2. 
5 Scope improvement 
The present section addresses the first sense of improvement mentioned earlier, namely, 
expanding the subset of 7 that a scientist identifies. 
5.1 Definition of scope improvement 
(25) DEFINITION: Let 8 E SCZ be given. The scope of 9, denoted "Sc[B]", is the set 
{ f E 7 1 8 identifies f). 
(26) DEFINITION: Let G 7 , 8  E SCZ, C C SCZ, and improvement operator J be given. 
(a) J G-improves 8 just in case GU Sc[9] C_ Sc[J(9)]. 
(b) J G-improves E just in case J G-improves every 9 E C. 
(c) C is G-improvable just in case some improvement operator G-improves C. 
The following proposition illustrates scope improvement; its simple proof is left for the reader 
(see Proposition (3)). 
(27) PROPOSITION: Let finite G 7 be given. Then, SCZ is G-improvable. 
5.2 Limits on scope improvement 
It is obvious that if "finite" is suppressed in Proposition (27) then the resulting claim is false. 
For, in this case G may be taken to be an unidentifiable subset of 7, thereby excluding all 
hope of G-improvement. Similarly, 8 E SCZ cannot be G-improved for any G C_ 7 such 
that Sc[B] U G  is not identifiable. It may still be asked, however, whether I= c SCZ is G- 
improvable if for all B E X, GU Sc[B] is identifiable. The following proposition provides a 
(very) negative answer to this question. It exhibits a class of scientists each with finite scope 
that is not G-improvable, even though G itself is quite simple. 
(28) PROPOSITION: {B E SCZ ( #(Sc[B]) 5 1) is not ZOS-improvable. 
PROOF: Let total recursive function d be such that for all i E N, 
Pd(i) = ((09 Y) I W(X) = Y & (VZ 5 x)((P;(z) converges)). 
Then, for all i E N: 
if cp; E 7; 
(Pd(i) = a finite function otherwise. 
Let total recursive function h be such that for all i E N, cph(i) is the constant d(i)-function. 
Then, for all i E N: 
sc[Ph(ii] = { ;"I if " E 7' 
otherwise. 
Hence, Sc[vh(;)] 5 1, for all i E N. 
For a contradiction, suppose that improvement operator J ZOSimproves S = {cph(;) I i E 
N). By Property (20) let total recursive function g be such that for all j E N, J(cpj) = cp,(j). 
Let z be an index for the constant zero-function. Define R E SCZ as follows. For all a E Seq: 
where i is least such that (i, 1) E mg(a), if such an i exists; 
otherwise. 
Then, it is easy to verify that R identifies ZOSU SI, contradicting Proposition (7). Hence, 
S is not ZOS-improvable. Hence, no superset of S is ZOS-improvable. . 
5.3 Scope improvement of RZG 
In contrast to the foregoing proposition, the next result indicates the extent to which rigorous 
scientists lend themselves to scope improvement: 
(29) PROPOSITION: Let G 7 be rigorously identifiable. Then RZG is G-improvable. 
We rely on the following lemma. 
(30) LEMMA: Let e be an index for 0. Then there is an improvement operator J such that 
for all B E RTG: 
(a) Sc[8] = Sc[J(8)]; and 
(b) for all f E 7, if J(8) does not identify f then J(8)(f [n]) = e for infinitely many 
n E N. 
Here and elsewhere, the following notation and terminology will be helpful. Given i, j E N,  
the partial recursive function cp;,j is defined as follows. For all k E N: 
if program i converges on input k within j steps; 
j k  = { f i n e d  otherwise. 
Let X N x N and Y N x N be given. We say that X and Y conflict just in case there 
are n, m,mt E N such that (n,m) E X ,  (n,mt) E Y, and m # mt. Given a E Seq of nonzero 
length, we denote by "a-" the result of removing a's last pair. 
PROOF OF LEMMA (30): By Property (21) (and since rigorous scientists are total), it 
suffices to exhibit an oracle machine M such that for all 9 E RZQ, conditions (a) and (b) of 
the lemma are satisfied if J(8) is the function computed by Me. Let 8 E SCZ and a E Seq 
be given. Then: 
e if lh(a) = 1; 
undefined if either 8(u) or 8(a-) are undefined; 
~ ' ( 0 )  = if 8(a) = 8(a-) and mg(a) and cpq,),p,(,) do not conflict; 
e otherwise. 
To see that M behaves as desired, let 8 E RZQ and f E 7 be given. If 8 identifies f 
then 8 converges on f to some i E N such that 8; is an infinite subset of f .  In this case, 
MB(f [m]) = 8(f [m]) for all but finitely many m E N,  so MB identifies f .  Suppose now that 
8 does not identify f .  Since 8 is rigorous, there is no m E N such that both cp, is a finite 
subset of f ,  and 8 converges on f to m. Consequently, either: 
(31) 8 converges to no index on f ;  or 
(32) 8 converges on f to an index for a function that is not a subset of f .  
In both cases (31) and (32)' MB(f [m]) = e for infinitely many m E N. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION (29): We rely on a construction employed by Minicozzi (see 
Blum & Blum, 1975). Let E RTQ identify G. By Property (21), it suffices to exhibit 
an oracle machine Z such that for all 8 E RZG, ZB identifies GU Sc[B]. Let J and e be 
as specified in Lemma (30). Define the function P : SCZ x Seq -+ N as follows. For all 
8 E SCZ, a E Seq: 
' 0 if Zh(u) = 1; 
undefined if any of 8(cr [O] ) . . . #(a [lh(a) - I]) 
are undefined; 
0 if e(a[x]) # e for all x < lh(a); 
the greatest x < lh(a) otherwise. 
, such that 8(a[x]) = e 
It is clear that P is "recursive in 8", i.e., computable by a suitable oracle machine. Note 
that if 8 E RIG (hence total), P(8, a )  is defined for all a E Seq. 
Z may now be specified as follows. For all 8 E SCZ, a E Seq: 
undefined if P(J(O), a )  is undefined; 
J(O)(a) i fP ( J (B) , a )<P(J (R) , a ) ;  
J ( 0 )  (a )  otherwise. 
Informally, Ze adopts J(8)'s conjecture until J(8) emits e, at which point Ze adopts J(0)'s 
conjecture, etc. Z is a computable function in O because J and P are. 
To see that Z behaves as desired, let f E GU Sc[8] be given. I f f  E G - Sc[8], then J(S2) 
converges to an index j for an infinite subset of f whereas J(8) emits e infinitely often. Hence 
Ze converges on f to j, and thus identifies f .  The cases f E Sc[8] - G and f E G n  Sc[8] are 
similar. W 
Since ZOS is rigorously identifiable (as easily verified), Proposition (29) yields the fol- 
lowing corollary, to be compared with Proposition (28). 
5.4 Limits on scope improvement within R Z G  
For G 7 that is not rigorously identifiable, G-improvement within RIG is also limited in 
nontrivial ways. This is the content of the following proposition. 
(34) PROPOSITION: {8 E RzQ 1 #(Sc[B]) 5 2) is not SI-improvable. 
Of course, since SI is identifiable, Proposition (3) implies that SIU Sc[B] is identifiable for 
any 8 E SCZ with #(Sc[O]) 5 2. For proof of the proposition we rely on a strengthened form 
of Lemma (6). Let (-, .) be a recursive isomorphism between N x N and N. 
(35) LEMMA: (Smullyan) Let total recursive functions g and h be given. Then there are 
m,n E N such that cpg((m,n)) = Orn and vh((m,n)) = (Pn- 
PROOF: See Rogers (1967, Theorem 11-X(a)).  
PROOF OF PROPOSITION (34): For a contradiction, suppose that improvement operator 
J SI-improves R = {e E RZQ 1 #(Sc[B]) 5 2). Then by Property (20) there is a total 
recursive function f such that: 
(36) for all i E N, if cp; E R then SIU Sc[cp;] C Sc[cpf(;)]. 
We shall define total recursive functions g and h such that for all y, z E N: 
(40) either: 
(a) YS((Y,Z)) (w) E {O,I) for all w E N, and cpf(,) does not identify cp,((,,)); or 
(b) cpf(,) does not identify Sc[~h((g,z))]. 
An application of Lemma (35) to g and h yield m , n  E N such that cp,((,,,)) = vrn and 
(Ph((m,n)) = Yn. Hence by (37) - (40): 
(41) cp,(x) = 0 for all x < m; 
(43) cp, E R; and 
(44) either: 
(a) vm(w) E { O , 1 )  for all w E N, and cpf(,) does not identify cp,; or 
(b) cpf(,) does not identify Sc[cp,]. 
Since (41), (42), and (44)a imply that cp, E SI, (41) - (44) contradict (36). 
Define p : Seq + N so that for all a E Seq, x E N: 
if x 5 lh(a) + 1; 
(PP(u)(x) = undefined otherwise. 
Observe that a scientist who conjectures cp,(,) on o E Seq does not compromise his rigor 
thereby but that such a conjecture is incorrect about any f E 7. In the construction to 
follow, p will be used to disrupt identification but ensure rigor. 
Let y, z E N be given. We now specify, in stages, both cp,((,,)) and (~h( (~ , , ) ) .  For notational 
ease, we abbreviate g((y, 2)) to g, h((y, 2)) to h, and f (2) to f .  
Stage 0: Let cp,(z) = 0 for all x < y. Let cp,(y) = 1. Let cph(u) = p(u) for all cr E Seq 
with lh(a) 5 y + 1. 
Stage 2n+1: Let m E N be greatest such that both cp,[m] and cph(cr) with lh(a) 5 m + 1 
are already defined. For all v E N such that cp f,,(cpg[m]) is divergent, let cp,(m + v + 1) = 0, 
and let cph(u) = p(u) for all a E Seq with lh(a) = m + v + 2. Let r be the least number, if 
such exists, for which cp f,,(cpg [m]) converges. Remark: If cp (cp, [m] ) diverges then the present 
stage does not terminate. In this case, cp,(w) E (0,l)  for all w E N, cph E RIG, Sc[ph] = 0, 
and cpf does not identify cp,. On the other hand, if cpf (cp,[m]) converges, then for the r above, 
cp,(x) is defined for al l  x 5 m + T ,  and cph(a) is defined for all a with lh(a) 5 m + T + 1. 
Assuming that the present stage terminates, carry these numbers m and r into the next 
stage. 
Stage 2nf-2: Let s, st  E 7 be such that: 
(a) s(x) = sl(x) = cp,(z) for all x 5 m + T ;  
(b) s(m + T + k) = 0 for all k > 1; and 
(c) s l ( m + r + k )  = 1 for all k 2 1. 
Call (u, v) E N "good" just in case ~ ~ , ~ ( s [ m  + r + u + 11) and cpf,,(sl[m + r + u + 11) are both 
convergent and they are not equal; call (u, v) "bad" otherwise. Search in increasing order 
for the least, good (u, v) E N. For each bad (u, v) encountered in this search, extend cph as 
follows. For all a E Seq with lh(a) = m + T + u + 1: 
r ( a )  if a = s [ m + r + u + l ]  or a = s 1 [ m + r + u + 1 ] ;  
= { p(u) otherwise. 
Let (t, d) be the least, good number, if such exists. Then, either 
Choose the smaller of s[m + r + t + 11, sl[m + r + t + 11 such that cpf,d of it is not equal to 
cpf (cpg[m + r + I]), say s[m + r + t + 11. Let w = max{u E N I (3v E N)((u, v) 5 (t, d)). 
(Thus, w 2 t and represents the longest initial segment of s examined in the search for a 
good number.) For all x with m + r  < x 5 m + r  + w + 1, let cpg(z) = s(x). Let cph(a) = p(a) 
for all a E Seq of length m + r + w + 2. (cph has already been defined for all shorter a E Seq.) 
Go to stage 2(n + 1) + 1. Remark: If there is no good number, then the present stage does 
not terminate. In this case, cph E 'JUG, Sc[ph] = {s, s') and cpf does not identify both s and 
sf (because no index is for a function that is an infinite subset of both s and s'), i.e., cpf does 
not identify Sc[ph]. On the other hand, if there is a good (t, d) E N, then for the w defined 
above: 
(a) cp,(x) is defined for all x 5 m + r + w + 1; 
(b) cph(a) is defined for all a with lh(a) 5 m + T + w + 2; 
(c) pf's convergence on cp, is delayed; and 
(d) ph9s convergence on both s and st is delayed. 
It is clear from the associated remarks that if any stage in the foregoing construction fails to 
terminate, then (37) - (40) above are satisfied. On the other hand, if all stages terminate, 
then cph E RZG, Sc[vh] = 0, cp,(w) E {O,1)  for all w E N, and cpf converges to no index on 
cp,. Consequently, (37) - (40) are satisfied in this case too. 
6 Probability improvement 
We now consider the second sense of improvement mentioned in the introduction, namely, 
transforming probable success into certain success. 
6.1 Probabilistic identification 
For purposes of the present section it is necessary to extend our model of scientific inquiry so 
as to incorporate less-than-certain identification. With minor departures, we follow Wieha- 
gen, Freivald & Kinber (1984) and Pitt (1985). 
(a) The class of all w-sequences over {O,1)  is denoted: Coin. 
(b) Given c E Coin and i E N, the i th member of c is denoted: c;. 
(c) Let f E 7 and c E Coin be given. The function ((x, (y,c,)) I f (x) = y )  is 
denoted: fc. 
Intuitively, f c  contains information both about f and about the successive tosses of a fair 
coin. 
(46) DEFINITION: Let 8 E SCZ, f E 7 and c E Coin be given. 8 identifies f in the 
presence of c just in case there is i E N such that: 
(a) 8 converges on f c  to i ;  and 
(b) cp; is an infinite subset of f .  
To proceed, we let M be the natural probability measure on Coin. Specifically, M is taken 
to be the unique, complete probability measure such that for each finite sequence S over 
(0, I), M({c E Coin 1 c begins with 6) )  = 2-1h(6). The following lemma is straightforwardly 
proven. 
(47) LEMMA: Let 8 E SCZ and f E 7 be given. Then M({c E Coin 1 8 identifies f in the 
presence of c ) )  is defined. 
(48) DEFINITION: Let p E [ O , l ] ,  8 E SCZ, f E 7, and G C 7 be given. 
(a) 8 identifies f with probability p just in case M({c E Coin 1 8 identifies f in the 
presence of c)) 2 p. 
(b)  8 identifies G with probability p just in case 8 identifies every f E G with prob- 
ability p. 
(c) G is identijiable with probability p just in case some 8 E SCZ identifies G with 
probability p. 
We continue to employ the term "identify" without probability qualification in the sense of 
Section 2. A simple construction suffices to prove the following proposition. 
(49) PROPOSITION: If G C 7 is identifiable, then G is identifiable with probability 1. 
A less trivial fact about probabilistic identification may be formulated as follows. 
(a) SIU ZOS is identifiable with probability f .  
(b) For all p > $, SIU ZOS is not identifiable with probability p. 
The proof of clause (a) of the proposition is left for the reader. Clause (b) follows from 
Proposition (7) and the corollary to the following result, due to Wiehagen, Freivald & Kinber 
(1984). 
(51) PROPOSITION: (Wiehagen, Freivald & Kinber, 1984) There is an improvement oper- 
ator J such that for all total 8 E SCZ and f E 7, if 8 identifies f with probability 
p > f then J(8) identifies f .  
PROOF: An adaptation of the proof of Proposition 10.6B of Osherson, Stob & Weinstein 
(1986). H 
(52) COROLLARY: Let G 7 be given. If G is identifiable with probability p > i, then 
G is identifiable. 
PROOF: By Proposition (51) and a simple adaptation of Proposition (4) to the probabilistic 
setting. 
6.2 Rigor in the probabilistic context 
The concept of "rigorous scientist" formulated in Definition (12) may be adapted to the 
present setting as follows. 
(53) DEFINITION: Let 8 E SCZ be given. 
(a) 8 is probabilistically rigorous just in case for all f E 7, n E N, and c E Coin, 
there is a pair (x, Y) such that (x,Y) E c~e((fc)[nl) - ~ ( f  [nI). 
(b) The class (8 E SCZ 1 8 is probabilistically rigorous) is denoted: PRIG. 
Similarly to before, rigor can interfere with probabilistic identification. 
(a) SI is identifiable with probability 1. 
(b) No 8 E PRIG identifies SI with probability p > 0. 
Clause (a) follows from Proposition (49). The proof of clause (b) is deferred to Section 6.5. 
6.3 Definition of probability improvement 
(55) DEFINITION: Let p E [O,1]  and 8 E SCZ be given. The p-scope of 8, denoted "St+[8In, 
is the set {f E I 1 8 identifies f with probability p). 
(56) DEFINITION: Let p E [O, 11, 8 E SCZ, E C SCZ, and improvement operator J be 
given. 
(a) J p-improves 8 just in case Sc,[B] C Sc[J(B)]. 
(b) J pimproves X just in case J p-improves every B E C. 
(c) C is pimprovable just in case some improvement operator pimproves Z. 
Observe that pimprovement gives rise to scientists that identify in the original sense of 
Section 2.2. To illustrate, Proposition (51) implies: 
(57) PROPOSITION: Let p > f be given. Then SCZ is p-improvable. 
6.4 Probability improvement in SCZ 
Propositions (7) and (50) imply that SCZ is not $-improvable. But even if we select just 
those scientists whose $-scopes are identifiable, the resulting set is not $-improvable. This 
is the content of the following proposition. 
(58) PROPOSITION: (8 E SCZ I Scl[B] is identifiable) is not $-improvable. 
2 
The following notation will be helpful. The class of finite sequences over { O , l )  is denoted: 
CoinSeq. Given a = (0, yo), ..., (n, y,) E Seq and a = xo, ..., x, in CoinSeq, the sequence 
(0, (yo, xo)), ..., (n, (yn, 2,)) E Seq is denoted: aa. (N.B. aa is not the concatenation of a to 
the end of a.) For a E CoinSeq and n < lh(a), a[n] is the initial segment of length n in a. 
PROOF: As in the proof of Proposition (28), let d E 7 be such that for i E N: 
if cp; E 7; 
vd(i) = 
a finite function otherwise. 
Let total recursive function h be such that for all i E N, a E Seq, and a E CoinSeq with 
lh(a) = lh(a): 
d(i) i f thef i r s tmemberofa is l ;  
~ h ( i )  ( aa )  = { r ( a )  otherwise. 
It may be seen that for all i E N,  SC&[$~~(;)] = ZOSU{cp;) if cp; E 7 ;  = ZOS otherwise. 
2 
Consequently, for all i E N, ScL[cph(;)] is identifiable. 
For a contradiction, suppose that improvement operator J $-improves S = {cph(;) I i E 
N). By Property (20) let total recursive function g be such that for all j E N, J ( p j )  = cpg(j). 
Define fl E SCZ as follows. For all a E Seq : 
cpg(h(i))(a) where i is least such that (i, 1) E rng(a), if such an i exists; 
= { cpg,h(o))(a) otherwise. 
Then, it is easy to verify that fl identifies ZOSU SI, contradicting Proposition (7). 
Positive results about a related concept of probability improvement may be found in Pitt 
(1985). 
6.5 Probability improvement in PRIG 
In contrast to Proposition (58), rigorous scientists lend themselves to probability improve- 
ment in a strong sense. 
(59) PROPOSITION: (based on Pitt, 1985) There is an improvement operator J such that 
for all 8 E PRIG 
(a) J(8) E 722G; 
(b) for all f E 7, if there is c E Coin such that 8 identifies f in the presence of c, 
then J(8) identifies f .  
That is, J creates from 8 E PRIG a rigorous scientist (in the nonprobabilistic sense) that 
identifies any f E 7 that 8 identifies in the presence of even one coin. 
PROOF: By Property (21) (and since PRIG C ( 9  E SCZ 1 8 is total)), it suffices to 
exhibit an oracle machine M such that for all 8 E PRIG, Me behaves as claimed for J(8). 
In what follows we shall be concerned only with M's behavior on total 8 E SCZ; Me(a) may 
harmlessly diverge for nontotal 8. To compute Me(a), let 8 E SCZ and a E Seq be given. 
Let i < lh(a) be least (if such exists) such that there exists /? E CoinSeq of length lh(a) such 
that: 
(61) i 5 j < lh(a) implies B((aP)[j]) = B((ap)[i]). 
The existence of such an i can be determined in finite time, since (P E CoinSeq I lh(P) = 
lh(a)) is finite. If no such i exists, let Me(a) = B(aa) where a E CoinSeq has length lh(a) 
and consists entirely of 0's. Otherwise, let P be lexicographically least satsifying (60) and 
(61) and let Me(a) = B((ap)[i]). 
To verify (a) and (b) of the proposition, let 8 E PRIG be given. For (a), we must show 
that for all f E 7 and k E N, ( ~ ~ e ( f [ k l )  -mg(f [k]) # 0. There are two cases, corresponding 
to the two cases in the definition of Me(f [k]). But in both cases, Me(f [k]) = 8(f [kla) for 
some a E CoinSeq of length k + 1. Since 8 E PRIG, (~e(f[kl,) - r g ( f  [k]) # 0. 
To verify (b), suppose that f E 7 and c E Coin are such that 8 identifies f in the presence 
of c. Let i be least such that there is p E CoinSeq of length i + 1 such that for all j > i 
there is a E CoinSeq of length j + 1 such that 8(f [jla) = 8(f [i]P) and 8(f [i]P) is an index 
for a subset of f .  Such an i exists since 8 identifies f in the presence of c. Also, 8(f [i]p) 
is necessarily an index for an infinite subset of f since 8 E PRIG. Fix the lexicographically 
least /3 with this property. Now it is apparent that Me converges on f to the index 8(f [ilp). 
(62) COROLLARY: There is an improvement operator J such that for all p > 0, J 
p-improves PRIG. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION (54)b: Suppose that 8 E PRIG identifies SCZwith probability 
p > 0. Then for the improvement operator J of the foregoing proposition, J(8) rigorously 
identifies SI contradicting Proposition (13). 
7 Related topics 
The present section is devoted to a variety of topics that bear on uniform improvement of 
scientific competence. 
7.1 Strategy improvement 
Can nonrigorous scientists be mechanically transformed into rigorous ones? We consider this 
question in the larger context of "strategy improvement." 
(a) A strategy is any subset of SCZ. 
(b) A strategy X c SCZ is restrictive just in case there is 8 E SCZ such that for all 
R E X, not Sc[B] Sc[n]. 
Thus, RZG is a strategy. By Proposition (13), RZG is restrictive. Note that we have 
returned to the nonprobabilistic conception of identification, introduced in Section 2. 
(64) DEFINITION: Let 8 E SCZ, C SCZ, strategy X, and improvement operator J be 
given. 
(a) J improves 8 to X just in case J(8) E X and Sc[8] C_ Sc[J(B)]. 
(b) J improves C to X just in case J improves every 8 E C to X. 
(c) C is improvable to X just in case some improvement operator improves C to X. 
It follows from our definitions that if strategy X is restrictive, then SCZ is not improvable 
to X. Now consider S = (0 E SCZ I #(Sc[8]) 5 1). For every 8 E S there is fl E RZG such 
that Sc[8] C_ Sc[R]. Nonetheless: 
(65) PROPOSITION: (8 E SCZ I #(Sc[8]) 5 1) is not improvable to RIG. 
PROOF: For a contradiction, suppose that improvement operator J improves S = (8 E 
SCZ I #(Sc[8] 5 1) to RZG. Then, T = (J(8) 1 9 E S) & RIG. So, Corollary (33) 
implies that some improvement operator I ZOS-improves T. Thus, I o J ZOS-improves S, 
contradicting Proposition (28). H 
Variants of the following strategies have been studied by other investigators. 
(66) DEFINITION: Let 8 E SCZ be given. 
(a) (Case & Ngo-Manguelle, 1979): 8 is popperian just in case for aJl a E Seq, 
cpq,,) E 7. {8 E SCZ I 8 popperian) is denoted: POP. 
(b) (Weihagen, 1976): 8 is consistent just in case for all a E Seq, rng(cr) E cpe(,). 
(8 E SCZ ( 8 consistent) is denoted: CON. 
(c) (Minicozzi, cited in Blum & Blum, 1975): 8 is reliable just in case 8 is total and 
for all f E 7, if 8 converges on f to i E N, then cp; is an infinite subset of f .  
(8 E SCZ ( 8 reliable) is denoted: REL. 
Observe that POP c RIG. Indeed, RZG may be conceived as a generalization of POP 
intended to capture the essence of the Popperian injunction of testability (see Popper, 1972). 
It may be shown that each of POP, CON, and REL are restrictive. This is obvious in the 
case of POP; for CON and REL, see Weihagen (1976) and Blum & Blum (1975), respectively. 
On the other hand, for any finite G C_ 7 it is easy to specify 8 E P O P n  CONn REL such 
that 8 identifies G. Parallel to Proposition (65) we have: 
(67) PROPOSITION: (0 E SCZ ( #(Sc[8]) 5 1) is improvable to neither POP, CON, nor 
REL. 
The proof of (67) uses the same technique as the proof of Proposition (29), and is omitted. 
Each of the strategies considered so far is restrictive, so we might ask whether there are 
nonrestrictive strategies for which improvement is similarly limited. The following proposi- 
tion provides an affirmative answer to this question. 
(68) PROPOSITION: There is X C SCZ such that: 
(a) X is not restrictive; but 
(b) SCZ is not improvable to X. 
PROOF: Given 8 E SCZ and m E N, let 8" E SCZ be defined as follows. For all a E Seq: 
if Ih(u) = 1; 
'("I = { B(u) otherwise. 
Call X SCZ a "choice strategy" just in case for every 8 E SCZ there is m E N such that 
8" E X. Observe that every choice strategy is nonrestrictive. 
By Property (24), let J o ,  J1,. . be an enumeration of all improvement operators J such 
that J(SCZ) is a choice strategy. Let 00, 81,. . . be an enumeration without repetitions of 
SCZ. For all i E N, let s(i) be the least m E N such that 87 E J;(SCZ). Such an m must 
exist because J;(SCZ) is a choice strategy. Let choice strategy X = {8:(')+' I i E N}. Then 
for all i E N, 8:(') E J;(SCZ) - X ,  hence J;(SCZ) X .  Consequently, SCZ is not improvable 
to X. . 
7.2 Improvement via programs 
Dropping the computability requirement on scientists yields the class SCZ* of all functions 
from Seq to N. Since improvement operators are just recursive operators in the sense of 
Rogers (1967, Section 9.8), they are defined on all of SCZ*. As a consequence, some of our 
results carry over to the broader context of SCZ*, notably Proposition (59). This feature of 
the present approach is related to the fact noted in Section 4 that improvement operators 
apply to computable scientists without having access to their programs. 
In the context of artificial systems of scientific inquiry such programs are accessible, 
and we are led to consider a different form of algorithmic improvement. We illustrate with 
scope-improvement . 
(69) DEFINITION: Let G C I, i E N, S C N, and partial recursive function S be given. 
(a) S G-improves i just in case 6(i) is defined, and G U Sc[cp;] & sc[cp6(;)]. 
(b) S G-improves S just in case S G-improves every i E S. 
In the definition, i should be conceived as a program for the scientist cp;. 
Does access to programs facilitate scope-improvement? The following proposition pro- 
vides an affirmative answer to this question. 
(70) PROPOSITION: There is S & N such that: 
(a) some partial recursive function S ZOS-improves S; but 
(b) no improvement operator ZOS-improves (cp; ( i E S}. 
PROOF: Let p be a total recursive, one-one "padding" function. In particular, for all 
x, y E N, cp,(,,,) = cp, and ~ ( x ,  y + 1) > ~ ( x ,  Y). Let S be the set of all numbers of form 
p(x, i + I) ,  where Sc[cp,] = (cp;}; or 
P(X, 01, where Sc[cp,] = 0. 
Then {pj ( j E S) = (8 E SCZ I #(Sc[d]) 5 1). Consequently, by Proposition (28), S 
satisfies clause (b). 
Regarding clause (a), observe first that p(x,i + 1) E S implies cp; E 7. Now let partial 
recursive function S be such that for all z E N, a E Seq: 
r ( a >  if z is of form p(x, 0); 
i if z is of form p(x,i + 1) and (3v)(rng(a) G F;,~); 
cpa(=) (a)  = r ( a )  if z is of form p(x, i + 1) and 
( 3 ~ 9  a, b)((a,b) E vi ,v  & a < lh(a) & (a, b) 6 r g ( a ) ) ;  
undefined otherwise. 
It is easy to verify that S satisfies clause (a). . 
Access to programs also facilitates strategy improvement. Let {d E SCZ ( 0 total} = 
TOT. Then Proposition (4) may be read this way: There is total recursive S that improves 
N to TOT, that is, for all i E N,  (P6(;) E TOT and Sc[cp;] & Sc[cp6(;)]. In contrast, we have: 
(71) PROPOSITION: SCZ is not improvable to TOT. 
PROOF: For a contradiction, suppose that improvement operator J improves SCZ to 
TOT. Let E SCT identify SI. Then J ( r )  identifies ZOS and J(Q) identifies SI. So by 
Proposition (7): 
Since 0 c I' and 0 52, Property (23) implies: 
(73) J(0)  C J ( r )  and J(0) C J(Q). 
However, J(0)  is total, so (73) implies: 
(74) J(0) = J(T) and J(0) = J(Q), 
which contradicts (72). 
We note that several of our results, e.g., Proposition (34) carry over to the case of 
improvement via programs. 
7.3 Improvement via hypotheses 
A natural class of improvement operators may be defined as follows. 
(75) DEFINITION: Let G E 7 , B  E SCZ, C C_ SCZ, and partial recursive 52 : N x Seq + N 
be given. 
(a) Q G-improves 9 via hypotheses just in case GU Sc[9] C Sc[Aa.Q(B(a), a)]. 
(b) fl G-improves C via hypotheses just in case 52 G-improves via hypotheses every 
9 E X. 
(c) C is G-improvable via hypotheses just in case some partial recursive function 
G-improves C via hypotheses. 
It is easy to see that 52 in the above definition determines an improvement operator in the 
sense of Section 4. On the other hand, a trivial construction reveals that there are improve- 
ment operators J such that for all partial recursive 0 : N x Seq + N, J # A9a.52(9(a), a). 
Improvement via hypotheses provides a rough model of scientific cooperation. For, the 
function Q may be conceived as a scientist who collaborates with colleague 9, benefiting from 
the theories announced by 9 in response to accumulating data. Cooperation between 52 and 
9 is successful if Aa.52(9(a), a) identifies the functions proper to the competencies of both fl 
and 9 (G and Sc[B], respectively). 
Does improvement via hypotheses constitute a normal form for scope-improvement? The 
following proposition provides a negative answer to this question. 
(76) PROPOSITION: There is G 7 and C C SCZ such that: 
(a) C is G-improvable; but 
(b) C is not G-improvable via hypotheses. 
PROOF: We rely on the following notation. Let f E 7 and G 7 be given. Then 
f O  =def I(x,(O,Y)) I (x,Y) E f} and Go =def If0 I f E GI. SeqO 'def {a E Seq I 
every member of mg(a) has the form (x, (0, y))). Let total recursive d be as defined in the 
proof of Proposition (28). Fix total recursive function h such that for all i E N, a E Seq: 
h i  = { d(i) if a E Seqo ; 
undefined otherwise. 
Let A = {vh(;) I i E N). An easy adaptation of the proof of Proposition (28) yields: 
(77) A is not 209-improvable. 
Now we "complete" the vh(;) in a way that depends on whether vd(;) E 7 or pd(i) is finite. 
Let e be an index for 8 that is not in the range of d, and let total recursive h' be such that 
for all i E N: 
vhqi) = ~ h ( i )  U{(a, d(i)) I 0 E Seq - SeqO} if vd(i) E I 
vh(;) U{(u, e) ( a f Seq - Seqo) if vd(i) is finite. 
To witness Proposition (76), let G = 209 and let C = {cphl(i) I i E N). 
To verify clause (b) of the proposition, suppose for a contradiction that R 209-improves 
C by hypotheses. We will show that R 209-improves A by hypotheses, hence that A is 209'- 
improvable, contradicting (77). Since 209-improves C by hypotheses, for all vhl(i) E C 
and all f E 209 u Sc[cpv(i)], Xa.a(cphl(i)(a), a )  identifies f . Since S C [ ~ ~ ( ~ ) ]  c S C [ ~ ~ ~ ( ~ ) ] ,  for 
all vhl(i) E C and all f E 209 U S~[(ph(i)], Ac .~~( (P~~(~) (c ) ,  a )  identifies f .  Now vy;) is the 
restriction of vhl(i) to Seqo, so X~.R(cph(~)(a), ) is the restriction to SeqO of Xa.R(cphl(i)(a), a) .  
Moreover, for all f E Z O m  S~[vh(i)], f [i] E SeqO for i E N. Hence X ~ . f i ( $ ? ~ ( ~ ) ( a ) ,  a )  
identifies f .  
Regarding clause (a), let r0 E SCZ be the obvious function for identifying 209. Let 
oracle machine M work as follows when equipped with total 8 E SCZ. Given a E Seq, 
e(a> if a $! SeqO; 
r 0 ( 4  if 8((0, (1,l))) = e; 
d(i) if 8((0, (1,l))) = d(i) and (3v)(~ng(a) C ~ i , v ) ;  
r o ( d  if O((0, (1,l)))  = d(i) and 
(3v, a, b)((a, b) E vi,v&a < lh(a) & (a, b) Sil mg(a)) 
undefined otherwise. 
It may be verified that for all 8 E C, Me identifies Z O 9 U  Sc[8]. Hence, by Property (21), 
C is 209-improvable. 4 
8 Concluding remarks 
Senses of "improvement" alternative to those studied here come readily to mind. For exam- 
ple, algorithms may be sought that render scientists more resistant to noisy data or more 
efficient in data use. Alternatively, an improvement operator might strengthen the criterion 
of identification to which a scientist conforms, for example, by requiring convergence on 
f E 7 to a program for (all of) f .  Each sense of LLimprovement" may be examined in a 
fashion parallel to the preceding developments. 
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